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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * *
ORVILLE RALPH COATES and
DONNA COATES, his wife,

)
}

)

Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
-vsAMERICAN ECONOMY INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant and
Appellant.

}
}
)
)
}
)

Case No. 17026

)
)
)
)

* * * * * * *
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

* * * * * * *
NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an action wherein plaintiffs seek survivor
benefits,

funeral

expenses and medical

expenses under

the

Personal Injury Protection Endorsement provided in an automobile

insurance

contract

between

the

plaintiffs
';

..

•#

..

~

and

the

defendant.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOW.ER COURT

The trial ~ourt in the First District Court of Box
Elder

County

granted

the

plaintiffs'

Motion

for

Sununary

Judgment against the defendant for survivor benefits, funeral expenses and medical costs.

The trial court held that

under the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act it is not
necessary that the injured person occupy. a motor vehicle as
defined in the No-Fault Act, but that where at least one of
the vehicles involved in an accident is a motor vehicle as
defined in the Act,

the injuries are covered by the insur-

ance required under the No-Fault Act.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Defendant-Appellant seeks a reversal of the trial
court's ruling and a determination that the Utah Automobile
No-Fault Insurance Act, § 31-41-1 et seq., o.c.A. (1953 as
amended),

specifically excludes persons riding motorcycles

from its coverage.
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STATEMENT OF PACTS

The

facts

necessary

for

a determination of

this

appeal are contained in a Stipulated Facts for Purposes of
Summary Judgment Only, said Stipulation having been entered
into by counsel of record for the parties herein.
50)

(R. 36 -

Briefly, those stipulated facts are as follows:
On the 8th day of July, 1978, Orville
Ralph Coates and Donna Coates, his wife, were
covered by an automobile insurance policy issued by American Economy Insurance Company.
Their son, Brent Ralph Coates, was an "insured
person" under his parents' policy. On or about
July 8, 1978, while said policy of insurance between plaintiffs and the defendant was in full
force and effect, the plaintiffs' son, Brent
Ralph Coates, was operating a motorcycle consigned to Vesco's Sports Center and while properly operating said motorcycle, was struck by
a motor vehicle operated by Ferris Reeder at
approximately 4th North and Main Street in Brigham City, Utah. -Brent Ralph Coates died that
same day as a result of injuries sustained in
the collision. The plaintiffs, as parents of
the deceased, have incurred and been required to
pay certain expenses in connection with the injuries, death and-burial of the deceased and have
suffered certain losses as the survivors of the
deceased. The plaintiffs have paid all funeral
expenses in connection with the burial of Brent
Ralph Coates and have incurred medical expenses
in the amount of $675.25.
The parties also attached

~,COP¥

insurance policy to the Stipulated Facts.
moved

the

trial

of

.~he_automobile

Both parties then

court for summary judgment and,

following

oral argument on their respective motions, the trial court
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entered

an Order

granting

plaintiffs'

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE
PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH AUTOMOBILE NO-FAULT
INSURANCE ACT, § 31-41-1 et seq., u.c.A.
(1953, AS AMENDED).
In

the Utah State Legislature adopted the

1973,

Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act to become effective
January 1, 1974.

The "No Fault Act" is codified at § 31-41-

1 through S 31-41-13. 4,
ended).

Utah Code Annotated { 1953, as am-

The purpose of the Act is stated in § 31-41-2 as

follows:
To require the payment of certain prescribed benefits in respect to motor vehicle accidents through either insurance or
other approved security but on the basis
of no fault • •
The

Act

accidents
either

provides
are

their

that

entitled

persons
to

injured

certain

in

motor

benefits

minimum

s~curity.

insurance policy or other
....

'!

vehicle

-

. '

from

Section

-·-

31-41-7 sets forth the applicability of the requfred insurance

coverage.

The

pertinent provisions

pf

that section

are:
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(1) The coverages described in Section
31-41-6 shall be applicable to:
(a) Personal injuries sustained by the
insured w~en injured in an accident in
this state involving any motor vehicle.

...
Section 31-41-3 sets forth the definition of the terms used
in the Act.

In pertinent part, the section provides:

(1) "Motor Vehicle" means any vehicle
of a kind required to be registered under
Title 41, but excluding, however motorcycles. (emphasis added)
These provisions of

the No-Fault Act

indicate a

specific legislative intent to exclude motorcycles from the
coverage of the Act.
Act

that

the

Protection

It is clear from the language of the

legislature

benefits

intended

normally

that

available

Personal
to

motor

Injury
vehicle

operators would not be available to persons injured while
operating

a

motorcycle.

. However,

language of

the statute

is dissolved

intent

crystal

made

clear

by

the

any

ambiguity

and

debate

the

in

the

legislative

surrounding

an

Amendment of the Act which occurred in 1975.
-

.,

In 197 5, Senate Bill - No. 45 prc;>poqed..
to the statutory language of the No-Fault Act.

a~

amendment

The amend-

ment was proposed in an attempt to correct a problem which
had

arisen concerning benefits claimed by persons

while riding motorcycles.

injured

Although the No-Fault Act as

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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originally enacted had excluded motorcycles from the defini-

tion of mote( vehicle, and therefore, presumably from coverage under the Act,

these persons were claiming benefits as

pedestrians.

The original definition of pedestrian

No-Fault Act,

§

means

any

"'Pedestrian'

31-41-3(6), was as follows:

natural

person not

occupying

in the

or riding

upon a

motor vehicle. 18
Since by definition a motorcycle was not a motor
vehicle,

persons

injured while riding

motorcycles claimed

that they were ent.i tled to benefits as pedestrians and the
legislative debate reveals that several of these claims had
been paid by insurance companies.

The amendment proposed to

change the definition of pedestrian to read:
means

any

natural

motor vehicle,
cupying

or

person

not occupying

ex cl ud ing,

riding

upon

however,
a

•'Pedestrian'

or riding

any natural

motorcycle."

The

upon a

person oclegislative

debate surrounding this proposed a:nend.11ent makes the intent
of the legislature, both as to the original passage of the
No-Fault Act,

and as to the amendment,

absolutely unambig-

uous.
Senator Wilford R.

Black,

[DJ

Salt Lake County,

sponsored the amendment and stated _that :_the~ reas~n for the
proposed amendment was to prevent the driver of a motorcycle
from having a "free ride" on the insurance of an automobile
driver who had no-fault insurance.

On February 4, 1 975 , the

senate

whole

became

a

committee

of

the

to

hear

evidence
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concerning

the proposed amendment.

Mr.

Melvin Summerhays

appeared from the Utah State Insurance Commissioner's Office
and testified,

in substance, that motorcycles were excluded

in most States from No-Fault Acts because the inherent risks
associated with motorcycles were too high for any reasonable
premiwn and insurance companies did not wish to combine the
risks of motorcycles together with the risks of the general
motoring public.
had

not

He stated that the Insurance Commissioner

anticipated

that

motorcyclists

claim benefits as pedestrians under
Act

and

that,

in

effect,

something for nothing.

would

be

able

to

the original No-Fault

the motorcyclist was

receiving

Mr. Summerhays testified:

In other words, if he has an accident with
your vehicle now, if he is at fault or otherwise, he can run into your car if you are
sitting still and he has benefits of your
no-fault policy as a pedestrian. Now the
reason this isn't fair is because you and I
will have to pay his premiums. We will have
to have our rates raised eventually. It will
cost you and I and the citizens additional premiums to take care of motorcyclists under the
Act if he is left a pedestrian. So the real
intent of the amendment is to take the motorcyclist out of the pedestrian classification
and leave him recourse to tort liability and
the Financial Responsibility Law where he belongs at a rate he can afford to pay.
.,
1

Mr.

Carl

Halbert,

an

insurance

•

·..

.

representative,

also testified and supported the statements of Mr. Summerhays.

Be reiterated

that in an accident between a motor

vehicle and a motorcycle, it is generally the driver and/or
passenger of the motorcycle that are injured and they are
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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receiving benefits which were not intended to be paid by the
No-Fault Insurance policies carried by automobile drivers,
Mr. Keith McCune of State Farm Insurance company testified

concerning

a

$22,000.00

to

injured
fault,

in

case
a

an

wherein

State· Farm had paid more

motorcyclist
accident

and

wherein

his
the

children

than

were

who

motorcyclist

was at

but was colle·cting from the Personal Injury Protec-

tion Benefits of the automobile driver's policy as a pedestrian.
In concluding the debate, Senator Black reiterated
the reasons for his sponsorship of the Amendment and claimed
that the present situation allowing motorcyclists to claim
benefits

as

pedestrians

was

Amendment should be adopted.

highly

unfair

and

that

the

The Senate subsequently adop-

ted the proposed Amendment.
The proposed &-rnendment was then considered by the
Utah

House

of

Representatives

February 12, 1975.

wherein

it was

Representative James Hansen,

debated on
[R]

Davis

County, argued that the general motoring public was picking
up the bill for motorcyclists and this was not intended when
the No-Fault Act was originally adopted.

He stated:

"All this is trying to do when s~nator ~lack
introduced this AmenCL-rnent.· is to take the
motorcyclist out of the definition of a
pedestrian. A motorcyclist should not be
a pedestrian, and I think they overlooked
that."
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Representative

T.

Quentin

Cannon

[R]

Salt

Lak·-!

County, stated:
0

We are saying they are no longer a pedestrian, nor are they covered by the No-Fault
Act. If the motorcyclist strikes me, or I
strike him, regardless of fault, they are
under the old system of tort liability • • • •
The motorcyclists don't want to be within
the No-Fault Act, because the premiums are
so high.
It will not shift liability. The
motorcyclist is under the old system of
tort reparations. This Amendment is making the motorcyclist carry the burden himself .. "
The Amendment

then was passed

by

the

House

and

became effective on May 13, 1975.
Appellant believes the above-cited history of the
legislative debate surrounding

the Utah No-Fault Act makes

it abundantly clear that the intent of the Utah Legislature,
both in enacting the original No-Fault Act, and in enacting
subsequent amendments, was to exclude motorcyclists from the
benefits of the coverages required under the Act.

Indeed,

when the legislature was made aware that motorcyclists were
receiving benefits pursuant to the Act as originally enacted, they quickly moved to amend that "loophole" to eliminate
any possibility that motorcyclists would be entitled to such
benef.i ts.
clear

Al though the appellant. raisea .the <Lssue of the

legislative

intent

behind

the

Memorandum of Points and Authorities,

No-Fault

Act

in

its

the trial court made

no finding concerning this issue and erred in failing to

-9-
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consider the legislative intent in interpreting the provisions of the No-Fault Act.
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that
in interpreting statutory language,

the legislative intent

is crucial to the determination of the meaning of the particular statute.

The Utah Supreme Court most recently dealt

with this principle in the case of Osuala v. Aetna Life a~
..
Casualty, 608 P.2d 242 (Utah 1980).
In that case, the
plaintiff . . was

injured

when

the automobile he was driving

collided with a truck own-ed by a construction companyc

The

plaintiff brought an action· against the construction company' s
under

insurer to obtain Personal Injury Protection Benefits
the

No-Fault

Act.

The

trial

court held

that the

plaintiff was neither an insured nor a person entitled to
protection

under

the

insurance

policy

issued to the construction company.
affirmed.

the

defendant had

On appeal, this court

In ruling on the plaintiff's claims pursuant

~

certain provisions of the No-Fault Act, this Court stated:
There are some cardinal rules of statutory
construction to be considered in relation ·
to this controversy. If there is doubt or
uncertainty as to the meaning or aoplication of the provisions_of an act, 1t is
appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in. the. light of
. . its· objective ,.. and
to harmonize its provisions in accordance
with the legislative intent and purpose • •

In the instant case, the Utah No-Fault ~ct in iU
entirety and in its objective is clearly to reduce the cost
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of automobile

insurance to

the motoring public.

This ob-

jective and the purpose underlying the entice Act would be
subverted by allowing motorcyclists to obtain benefits under
the Act for which they have not paid and the cost of which
must be borne by the general motoring public.
tive debate makes clear
Act and
failing

the legislative intent behind

appellant contends
to analyze

The legislathe

that the trial court erred

in

the Act consistent with the principles

enunciated above.

POINT I I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING THE
RATIONALE OF CASE LAW FROM OUTSIDE THE
JURISDICTION AND ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF SAID CASE LAW.
The

trial

court's

Order

granting

plaintiff's

Summary Judgment is based upon the trial court's own Memorandum Decision dated March 24,
court's

Memorandum

concerning

the

issue

1980

Decision,

the

raised

in the

(R.

Court

56 -

58)

In the

discusses

instant case and

cases
con-

eludes that certain of these cases are the better reasoned
view and subsequently holds for the plaintiffs and respondents.

However, defendant and appellant believes' that most,

if not all, of these cases are inapplicable to the instant
case for

the simple reason that no other state's No-Fault

statute is identical to that of the State of Utah, nor are
they

even

substantially

similar.
-11-

Further,

defendant and
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appellant contends that the trial court erred in its interpretation of certain of these cases.
Appellant believes that the better reasoned view
is represented by the case of Speakman v. State Farm Mutual

1979).

Automobile Insurance Company, 402 Ao2d 123 (Md. App.
In

that

case,

automobile
policy

the plaintiff

insurance

provided

coverage.

The

was

policy

plaintiff

named

issued
in

$10, 000 .. 00

the

by

personal

brought

an

insured

in an

defendant,

which

injury
action

protection
against

the ·

defendant for hospital and medical bills and loss of income
suffered as a result of an accident wherein the plaintiff,
while

operating

bile.

his

motorcycle,

was

struck

by

an automo-

The Maryland No-Fault Act did not expressly exclude

motorcycles

from

its prov is ions,

expressly provides.

as

the Utah No-Fault Act

However, the Maryland No-Fault Act did

provide that insurance companies could exclude benefits for
persons injured while operating motorcycles.

The defendant

insurance company chose to ·specifically exclude benefits for
persons

injured while riding motorcycles and the plaintiff

conceded

the

legitimacy of

the exclusion contained in the

policy.

However, the plaintiff argued that since the

dent in which he was injured
i.e.

the

automobile

entitled to benefits.

involv~d

ano~h~r ~otor

with which he collided,

vehicle,

he was still

The Court of Special Appeals of
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ace~

Maryland affirmed the trial court's holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to benefits under the plain and unambiguous language of the insurance policy.
Appellant

believes

that

the

Speaki~an

case

is

correct in its interpretation of the phrase upon which the
plaintiffs and

respondents

rely in the instant case,

i.e.

that plaintiff's decedent was killed in an accident "involving any motor vehicle."

Indeed, the Maryland case revolved

around the chosen language in the insurance policy, whereas
the instant case revolves around statutory language intended
by the Utah Legislature to exclude motorcyclists from benefits under the Act.
The trial court was pursuaded by cases other than
The trial court cited the

the Maryland case cited above.

New Jersey cases of Hoglin
v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
c
Company, 366 A.2d 345 (N.J. App. 1976) and Harlan v. Fidelit:(

&

Casuali;.Y Company,

353 A.2d

151

support of its ultimate decision.

(N.J.

App.

1976)

in

However, the Heglin case

revolved around an obvious conflict between the terms of the
ins_urance policy between plaintiff
statutory

language

of

the

insurance company attempt
conflict
Jersey,

with

the

Appellate

and defendant

New Jersey
to

statute
Division,

No-Fault Law.

limit coverage was

and

the

held

and

found

the
The
to

Superior Court of New
that

the

plaintiff

was

entitled to benefits, although he was occupying a motorcycle
at the time of the accident.

-13-

Moreover, the New Jersey Court
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relied upon a treatise prepared by the former counsel to the
New

Jersey

Automobile

Insurance

Study

which

Commission

concluded that the intent of the Act was to provide coverage
in the type of situation before the court.

The Harlan case

is yet another example of a conflict between the provisions
of the insurance policy and the provisions of the No-Fault
Law, where the court held that the statute prevails.
is

not

the

issue

before

Indeed,

the

defendant

and

the

court

appellant

in
in

the

This

instant case,

the. instant case

modeled its language in the insurance policy precisely after
the statutory language contained in the Utah No-Fault Act,
relying on the clear meaning and legislative intent behind
the Act that motorcyclists would be excluded from coverage.
The trial court proceeded in its Memorandum Decision to cite the case of Sh.oemaker v ~ Na tion~l Ben Franklin
of Michigan, 259 N. W. 2d 414 (Mich. App. 1977), as supportive
of the trial court's holding.
that

the

case.

trial

court

However, appellant believes

clearly erred

in relying

upon this

In the Michigan case, the plaintiff was injured while

riding a motorcycle which collided with a farm tractor.

The

plaintiff brought suit to recover No-Fault Benefits from his
automobile

insurance

company.·

The

t~ial
•!

..

court
•a'°'

granted

:

Summary Judgment to the insurer and, on appeal, the court of
Appeals
grounds.

of Michigan affirmed,

al though remanding on other

The court stated in part:
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• • • It is this court's duty to determine
the legislative intent, looking at t~~ language used in the set statute, its su~ject matter, scope and purpose, and the act s~~~ld be
construed to render it internally consistent
and to avoid absurd results. • • • It is our
belief that it would work an absurdity to hold
that plaintiffs can recover for injuries from
a motorcycle accident, because of the fortuitous purchase of an automobile No-Fault policy,
after the legislature went to great lengths to
exclude tractors and motorcycles from coverage
under the Act. Having limited an insurer's risk
to not include motorcycles, we find no legislative intent nor judicial prerogative to impose an even greater risk by imposin3 liability
on an insurer that has issued a policy on an
automobile and has issued no policy on a motorcycle.
How the Shoemaker case can be said to support the
trial court's ruling is beyond the capacity of the appellant
to

understand

or

However,

explain.

appellant

wishes

to

point out to this Court that in a later Michigan case, Piersante

v.

American

N.W.2d 691

Fidelity

Fire

Insurance

Company,

278

(Mich. App. 1979), the Michigan Court rendered a

decision substantially supporting the trial court's decision
in the instant case.
the

It should be also noted, however, that

Michigan No-Fault Act appears substantially different

from that of Utah and that the. Michigan Court in Piersante
relied heavily upon certain priority provisions of the Act
in reaching its result.
Finally, the trial court relied upon dicta from a
Florida case, Negron v. The Travelers Insurance Company, 282
S. 2d 28

(Fla. App.

similar or

relevant

1 973) •
to

The facts of that case are not

the
-15-

instant case

and appellant

is
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unable

to

explain how

the

dicta

in Negron

is

applicable

here.

In any event, the Florida Court was later presented

with the precise issue now before this court in Long Island
Insurance Company v.· Frank, 328 S.2d 542 (Fla. App. 1976).
In that case, the plaintiff in the trial court, Mr. Frank,
brought suit to recover No-Fault Benefits on behalf of his
injuri~

minor son, a member of plaintiff's household, for
sustained

while

the minor

son was operating

which collided with another motor vehicle.

a motorcycle

Plaintiff

urg~

the same argument on the Florida Court that plaintiffs and
respondents

urge

in

the

instant

case,

that

because

accident involved a motor vehicle, the plaintiff is
to recover benefits.

However,

and

the

held

in

favor of

the

entitl~

the Florida Court disagreed

insurance company,

thus clearly

indicating that the dicta from Negron does not support the
trial

court's decision nor

the position of the plaintiffs

and respondents.
Defendant and appellate does not believe that aey
case from a jurisdiction outside the State of Utah is particularly

applicable,

before this Court.
appears to be unique

much

less

disposi tive,

abov·e

in
and,

the

the

issue

The language of the Utah No-Fault Act
in comparison witt\. the language con~

tained

of

No-Fault Acts construed

therefore, ·those

cases

in

cannot

.. .... ..

the

.

cases cited

determine

interpretation of different language in the Utah statute.
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the

CONCLUSION

Defendant and appellant urges this Court to apply
the excellent criteria contained in the Osuala case concerning the issue of statutory construction.
that

the

stated

Utah

No-Fault

objective,

Act

in

its

its legislative

Appellant believes

entirety,

its

clearly

intent and purpose,

all

combine to make clear the meaning of the statutory provision
at issue.

The Utah Legislature clearly intended to exclude

motorcyclists from the benefits of the Act and the statutory
language

reflects

that

While

intent.

at least one court

outside the State of Utah has ruled on this

issue consis-

tently with appellant's position, appellant does not believe
that case law from outside

the State is readily applicable

to a determination of the meaning of a Utah Statute, pecu1 iar

to Utah.

decision

of

the

Appellant urges
trial

court

this Court

and

to

remand

to reverse the
the

case

for

further proceedings consistent with that opinion.
Respectfully submitted this

IC+-11-..,...

day of July,

1980.
KIPP

&.~D

CHRISTIAN, P.C.

_-i~b~ L0{Ljr\

Thomas N. Arnett, J~
32 Exchange ?lace
600 Corru~ercial Club
ild" g
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 521-3773
Attorneys for Appellant
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